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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Domestic Relations-Consent Judgments for Alimony-Subsequent
Modification and Enforcement by Contempt
It appears that in the area of consent judgments in North Carolina,
especially with respect to alimony decrees,1 the subtleties of the form of
the judgment play a major role in determining the subsequent rights of
the parties. A recent case2 serves notice of the unforseen consequences
that can result from a seemingly simple consent judgment involving
alimony and support for a wife and child. The decision seems3 to re-
iterate the general North Carolina rule that an award of alimony by
virtue of a consent judgment is not enforceable by contempt and is not
subject to modification without the consent of the parties.
It is a well-accepted rule that an alimony obligation pursuant to a
court degree is not a debt within the meaning of the usual constitutional
prohibition against imprisonment for debt.4 Therefore, the husband can
be held in contempt for a wilful failure to comply with the decree. 5
However North Carolina has repeatedly held that consent judgments
based on agreement 6 of the parties do not rise to the dignity of an af-
firmative court decree so as to be enforceable by contempt.7 This gen-
payments in lieu of wages for a period during which the employee is absent from
work on account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable from gross income
to the extent of $100 a week. This is one example of the difficulty that would be
presented to a jury in determining the award in a personal injury action if they
were allowed to consider the tax aspects.
'This Note will deal primarily with consent judgments entered only with
respect to alimony decrees because the question of the propriety of contempt
proceedings arises most frequently here. Most other judgments for the payment of
money cannot be enforced by contempt proceedings because they are construed as
imposing a debt within the meaning of the usual constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt.2 Holden v. Holden, 245 N. C. 1, 95 S. E. 2d 118 (1956).
' The factual situation is complicated and it is not exactly clear on what basis
the court made its holding. The lower court altered a prior consent judgment
awarding alimony payments to the wife, and later the court held the husband in
contempt for failure to make the payments as specified in the altered decree. The
supreme court reversed; one of the grounds apparently was that the original order,
being a consent judgment, could not be modified nor enforced by contempt pro-
ceedings.
' Ex Parte Hall, 125 Ark. 309, 188 S. W. 827 (1916) ; Ex Parte Silvia, 123 Cal.
293, 55 Pac. 988 (1899) ; In re Popejoy, 26 Colo. 32, 55 Pac. 1083 (1899) ; Bronk
v. State, 43 Fla. 461, 31 So. 248 (1901) ; Heflinger v. Heflinger, 172 Ga. 889, 159
S. E. 242 (1931) ; Pain v. Pain, 80 N. C. 322 (1879) ; 17 Am. JUR., Divorce and
Separation § 666 (1938) ; Annot., 30 A. L. R. 130 (1924).5 In England even though a violation of an alimony decree is contempt of court
the person himself cannot be attached, however. De Lossy v. De Lossy (1890)
LR 15 Prob. Div. (Eng.) 115; 8 HALSBTURy, LAWS OF ENGLAND 22 (3d ed. 1954).
0 Prior to 1947 a consent judgment, being merely a contract between the parties,
was not valid to pass an interest in real property unless the privy examination of the
wife were taken. Ellis v. Ellis, 193 N. C. 216, 136 S. E. 350 (1927). In 1947 the
statute relating to contracts between husband and wife was amended to add the
present N. C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (d) (Supp. 1955) : "This section shall not apply
to any judgment of the superior court which, by reason of its being consented to
by a husband and his wife, or their attorneys, may be construed to constitute a
contract between such husband and wife."
Davis v. Davis, 213 N. C. 537, 196 S. E. 819 (1938) ; Webster v. Webster,
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eral rule was not applied in at least two earlier cases because the consent
judgment specified that the husband would be subject to contempt
proceedings on default, or the court in its decree reserved the right to
make further orders in the cause.
In Edmundson v. Edmundson8 the decree contained the following
proviso: "The money payments -provided herein shall be more than a
simple judgment for debt. They shall be as effectively binding upon
plaintiff [husband] as if rendered under and by virtue of the authority of
[G. S. § 50-16] ... and the failure of the plaintiff to make the payments
... shall ... subject him to such penalties as may be required by the
court, in case of contempt of its orders." The Supreme Court held
this sufficient to enable the lower court to hold the husband in contempt
for failure to comply with the decree. The judge in Dyer v. Dyer 0 stated
in the decree that by the consent of the parties the husband was to pay
wife a certain sum "pending further orders of this court."'" This was
held sufficient to create a definite decree of the court rather than a mere
sanction of the contract of the parties; the decree was therefore enforce-
able by contempt.
The position taken in the above two cases was recognized in Lentz v.
LentS.12 In a per curiam decision, the court decided there could be no
contempt proceeding under the particular consent judgment in issue,
saying: "There is no provision in the judgment in the present action
that leaves the matter open, or any provision giving the court discre-
tionary power .... -" Thus it appears that in order for the wife to hold
a. coercive hand over the husband's head it would be wise to request the
court to write in an express provision for contempt or to reserve future
powers of modification.
The principal case seems to be in line with previous North Carolina
decisions on this point because the lower court's decree contained no
language such as that in the Edmundson and Dyer decrees. The court
stated in the principal case: "The judgment merely sets out the payments
agreed upon for the support of the defendent [wife] . . . and the court
did not decree that the payments should be made by the plaintiff. 1 4
Thus the net effect is that the court has merely affirmed the agreement
of the parties and it will be enforceable as an ordinary contract.
213 N. C. 135, 195 S. E. 362 (1938); Lentz v. Lentz, 194 N. C. 673, 140 S. E.
440 (1927). N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-247 (1953) was amended in 1947 to provide
that a judgment by confession enforceable by contempt could be entered for
alimony or for support of minor children. The purpose of the amendment is tohave a simplified method of converting an agreement between the parties into ajudgment enforceable by contempt. See Case Survey, 25 N. C. L. REV. 376, 389-
90 (1947) for a brief comment on this.
8222 N. C. 181, 22 S. E. 2d 576 (1942) ; Note, 21 N. C. L. REv. 307 (1943).
Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N. C. 181, 182, 22 S. E. 2d 576, 578 (1942).
'°212 N. C. 620, 194 S. E. 278 (1937). " Id. at 621, 194 S. E. at 279.
"194 N. C. 673, 140 S. E. 440 (1927). " Id. at 674, 140 S. E. at 440.
"Holden v. Holden, 245 N. C. 1, 6, 95 S. E. 2d 118. 122 (1956).
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North Carolina seems to be in the minority concerning the effect of
a consent judgment from the standpoint of enforceability. Most juris-
dictions hold that once the agreement of the parties is incorporated into
the court decree,' 5 or is simply restated in the form of a decree,16 the
contract is superseded by the court order and it has the full force and
effect of a decree enforceable by contempt. The fact that the decree con-
sists entirely of the parties' agreement, without further orders from the
court, does not appear to preclude enforceability by contempt proceedings.
However if the decree merely refers to the agreement and the terms
of the agreement are not actually set out in the decree, it is still a contract
and not enforceable by contempt."7
Another consequence of holding the court order to be a mere approval
of the agreement of the parties and not a court decree is that it cannot
be modified without the consent of the parties unless it was unfair to the
wife or was obtained by fraud or mutual mistake. This is in line with
many previous North Carolina decisions concerning consent judgments,
not only in divorce and separation cases but also in other areas.' s
As a general rule an alimony decree, unless awarded in conjunction
with an absolute divorce, 19 can be modified on the application of either
5 Sessions v. Sessions, 178 Minn. 75, 226 N. W. 701 (1929); Karteus v.
Karteus, 67 N. D. 297, 272 N. W. 185 (1937); Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 153
S. E. 879 (1930); see Holloway v. Holloway, 130 Ohio St. 214, 216, 198 N. E.
579, 580 (1935) : "A decree which incorporates an agreement is a decree of court
nevertheless, and as soon as incorporated into the decree the separation agreement
is superseded by the decree, and the obligations imposed are not those imposed by
contract, but are those imposed by decree, and enforceable as such .... Where a
court, in its divorce decree, adopts the language of a separation agreement, it does
not thereby reduce the status of the decree to that of a mere contract. While a
contract may become a decree of court, a decree of court cannot assume the status
of a mere contract."
" Ex Parte Dukes, 155 Ark. 24, 243 S. W. 863 (1922) ; Cox v. Cox, 197 Ga.
260, 29 S. E. 2d 83 (1944) ; Estes v. Estes, 192 Ga. 94, 14 S. E. 2d 681 (1941) ;
Barrett v. Barrett, 287 Ky. 216, 152 S. W. 2d 610 (1941) ; Hargis v. Hargis, 252
Ky. 198, 66 S. W. 2d 59 (1933).
" Lazar v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 617, 620, 107 P. 2d 249, 250 (1940)
("If a property settlement agreement is complete in itself and is merely referred
to in a divorce decree or approved by the court but not actually made a part of the
decree, then the provisions of such agreement cannot be enforced by contempt
proceedings.") ; Stanley v. Stanley, 226 N. C. 129, 37 S. E. 2d 118 (1946) ; Brown
v. Brown, 224 N. C. 556, 31 S. E. 2d 529 (1944).
18 Spruill v. Nixon, 238 N. C. 523, 78 S. E. 2d 323 (1953) (easement); Lee v.
Rhodes, 227 N. C. 240, 41 S. E. 2d 747 (1947) (ejectment); King v. King, 225
N. C. 639, 35 S. E. 2d 893 (1945) (assumpsit) ; Keen v. Parker, 217 N. C. 378, 8
S. E. 2d 209 (1940) (ejectment) ; Weaver v. Hampton, 201 N. C. 798, 161 S. E
480 (1931) (action against county commissioners for corrupt refusal to perform
duties) ; Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E. 2d 25 (1920) (separation
agreement).
" If the alimony is decreed pursuant to an absolute divorce, the general rule is
that it cannot be subsequently modified. Kenard v. Kenard, 131 Fla. 473, 179 So.
660 (1938) ; Hardy v. Pennington, 187 Ga. 523, 1 S. E. 2d 667 (1939) ; Duff v.
Duff, 275 Ky. 367, 121 S. W. 2d 933 (1938) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 127 Pa. Super.
567, 193 A t. 860 (1937). In North Carolina this problem will not arise because
there can be no permanent alimony granted in conjunction with an absolute
divorce. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11 (Supp. 1955), Duffy v. Duffy, 120 N. C. 346,
27 S. E. 28 (1897). But where there is a valid separation agreement followed by
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party according to their varying circumstances, 20 and this is true even
though there was no provision in the decree allowing for a modification. 21
However, the parties can make an agreement between themselves as to
a proper sum to be paid, subject to the approval of the court that it is
fair to the parties at the time it is made. This will be enforceable as a
contract 22 and will not be subject to modification without the consent
of the parties.2 3 But if the court renders an alimony decree which is
based upon,24 adopts, or incorporates2- an agreement entered into by the
parties, the general trend is to the effect that it can be modified.2 6 There
is a distinction between judgments based on the agreement of the parties
and consent judgments in the technical sense. The generally prevailing
rule, as in North Carolina, is that the latter cannot be modified,27 although
the former can be.
North Carolina follows a consistent pattern in saying consent judg-
an absolute divorce, the agreement stands and is enforceable as a contract. Jenkins
v. Jenkins, 225 N. C. 681, 36 S. E. 2d 233 (1945) ; Lentz v. Lentz, 193 N. C. 742,
138 S. E. 2d 12 (1927).
2 Robinson v. Robinson, 250 Ky. 488, 63 S. W. 2d 605 (1933); Weiner v.
Weiner, 242 App. Div. 847, 275 N. Y. Supp. 177 (2d Dep't 1934) ; Gloth v. Gloth,
154 Va. 511, 153 S. E. 879 (1930) ; Annot., 71 A. L. R. 700 (1931).
" Anderson v. Anderson, 124 Cal. 48, 56 Pac. 630, 57 Pac. 81 (1899) ; Sperry v.
Sperry, 80 W. Va. 142, 92 S. E. 574 (1917). As a general rule past due install-
ments are not subject to modification. COHEN, DIVORCE AND ALIMONY IN NORTH
CAROLINA 172 (1949). Therefore the past due installments can be enforced in a
foreign State. Barber v. Barber, 323 U. S. 77 (1944). But since future payments
are subject to modification by the court granting the decree, there will normally be
no judgment in a foreign State as to these future payments. Lynde v. Lynde, 181
U. S. 183 (1901).
2 The leading case of Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N. C. 408, 74 S. E. 327 (1912)
was the first acknowledgment by North Carolina that separation agreements entered
into between husband and wife were not against public policy, provided there were
certain safeguards for the protection of the wife and society.
2 Pryor v. Pryor, 88 Ark. 302, 114 S. W. 700 (1908) ; North v. North, 339
Mo. 1226, 100 S. W. 2d 582 (1936) ; Morris v. Patterson, 180 N. C. 484, 105 S. E.
25 (1920) ; Sinkler v. Sinkler, 49 N. D. 1144, 194 N. W. 817 (1923) ; Buckminster
v. Buckminster, 38 Vt. 248, 88 Am. Dec. 652 (1865).
2 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1 (1935) ; Briggs v. Briggs, 178 Ore. 193, 165
P. 2d 772 (1946) ; Annot., 166 A. L. R. 666 (1947).
2 Worthington v. Worthington, 224 Ala. 237, 139 So. 334 (1932) ; Warren v.
Warren, 116 Minn. 458, 133 N. W. 1009 (1912) ; Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal. 2d 605,
160 P. 2d 15 (1945).
26 There is a recognized split as to whether alimony decrees based on agree-
ments are subject to modification. See KEEZER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 716 (3d
ed. 1946) ; Note, 44 HARv. L. REV. 127 (1930) ; Note, 27 ORE. L. REV. 130 (1948).
The reason usually given for allowing a modification is that as the court has the
duty to grant alimony it is not bound by the agreement of the parties concerning
the amount to be awarded; consequently, the agreement cannot hinder the court
from modifying the decree. Cf. Commissioner v. Maresi, 156 F. 2d 929 (2d Cir.
1946).
Occasionally a distinction is made that if the judgment orders payment of some-
thing other than alimony in the technical sense of the word, it will be enforceable
as a contract between the parties rather than as an obligation arising out of the
marital relationship. Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md. 166, 145 Atl. 488 (1929)
Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675, 141 Atl. 387 (1928).
2" Keach v. Keach, 217 Ky. 723, 290 S. W. 708 (1927) ; Karnes v. Black, 185
Ky. 410, 215 S. W. 191 (1919) ; McArthur v. Thompson, 140 Neb. 408, 299 N. W.
519 (1941) ; Brady v. Hyman, Tex. Civ. App., 230 S. W. 2d 342 (1950).
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ments can neither be modified nor enforced by contempt, whereas the
majority rules refuse modification but allow contempt proceedings. It
is submitted that as to contempt the majority is the better view; otherwise
the judgment is of no practical value to the wife other than as a judicial
affirmation of the contract existing between the parties. She would be
as well off without the decree because she can enforce it only by the usual
methods of enforcing contracts. By'the same token, it is thought that
the minority view as to modification is preferable. If a judge with veto
power over the terms of the agreement approves them and sets them out
in the decree, this should be sufficient adoption of the terms to make
them a part of the decree.
In view of the distinction made in North Carolina between consent
judgments and ordinary alimony decrees, however, it is advisable that
the attorney carefully word the form of the judgment so as to preserve
in the court further rights in the cause. As seen in the Edmiundson and
Dyer cases, the subsequent rights of the parties are materially affected by
the technical form of the judgment.
HAMLIN WADE
Domestic Relations-Consequences of a Voidable Divorce Decree
In the recent case of Harmon v. Harmon,' the husband, after obtain-
ing a decree of absoulte divorce on grounds of two years separation, re-
married. Thereafter, the first wife was successful in her motion in the
cause to have the divorce decree set aside, because the clerk of court had
not mailed to her a copy of the notice of service by publication as
required by statute2 The trial judge gave an order vacating the decree,
but did not dismiss the action and ordered the clerk to make proper
service of process on the defendant wife. Upon proper service of
process, the wife filed her answer setting up as a defense to the divorce
action the cohabitation arising out of the second marriage as adulterous
and therefore a bar to her husband's action. The Supreme Court
rejected the wife's contention and affirmed the divorce decree. The
court stated that since the husband had done all that was required of him
by law and there was no evidence of any intentional wrong or fraud on
his part in the procurement of the divorce decree, his cohabitation with
the second wife up to the time he knew the decree would be set aside was
not adulterous so as to bar his right of action.
This appears to be the first case in which the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has considered the effect of an error in the procedure of
service of process by publication pursuant to N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-99.2
1245 N. C. 83, 95 S. E. 2d 355 (1956).
2 N. C. GaN. STAT. § 1-992(c) (1953): "The clerk shall mail a copy of the
notice of service of process by publication to each party whose name and residence
or place of business appear in the verified pleading or complaint. ... "
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